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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Respondent, : Case No. 920185 
v. : 
CHARLES MONTGOMERY, : Category No. 14 
Petitioner. t 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari 
to the Utah Court of Appeals. This Court has jurisdiction to 
hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) 
(1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues presented in this case are: 
1. Did the court of appeals properly affirm 
petitioner's conviction and decline to review the merits of 
petitioner's claim on appeal, i.e., that the trial court 
submitted to the jury an inadequate instruction on reasonable 
doubt, when petitioner's trial counsel assisted the trial court 
in drafting the instruction? An objection to a jury instruction 
is not properly preserved for review without a statement for the 
ground of the objection. State v. Medina. 738 P.2d 1021, 1023 
(Utah 1987). However, the appellate court may review an issue 
improperly preserved for appeal in order to avoid "manifest 
injustice." Ibid. "But if a party through counsel has made a 
conscious decision to refrain from objecting or has led the trial 
court into error, [an appellate court] will then decline to save 
that party from the error." State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 158 
(Utah 1989), cert, denied, Bullock v. Utah, 110 S. Ct. 3270 
(1990). 
2. Did submission of the reasonable doubt instruction 
give rise to reversible error sufficient under the plain error 
rule? Under the plain error rule a defendant must show that the 
error was both obvious and prejudicial such that there is a 
reasonable likelihood of a different result. State v. Verde, 770 
P.2d 116, 122 (Utah 1989). Because this issue presents a 
question of law, the trial court's ruling is not entitled to any 
particular deference, and the ruling should be reviewed for 
correctness. State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 789 (Utah 1991). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Determinative constitutional provisions, statutes and 
rules are compiled in Appendix A where not set forth in the body 
of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Petitioner, Charles Montgomery, was charged by 
information with attempted murder, a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-203 and S 76-4-101 (1990) 
(R. 1). Following a jury trial in the Eighth Judicial District 
Court in and for Uintah County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Dennis L. Draney, presiding, petitioner was convicted of 
attempted manslaughter, a third degree felony, under Utah Code 
2 
Ann. SS 76-5-205 and 76-4-101 (1990), and was sentenced to a term 
of not more than five years in the Utah State Prison (R. 173-74). 
Petitioner filed motions for a new trial and arrest of judgment, 
claiming, in part, that the trial court erred in failing to 
submit an adequate reasonable doubt jury instruction (R. 166-72). 
The trial court denied the motions (R. 182, Appendix B). 
On appeal, petitioner addressed only his claim 
concerning the inadequacy of the reasonable doubt jury 
instruction, arguing that, notwithstanding his failure to raise 
the issue below, the conviction should be reversed pursuant to 
the plain error doctrine (Petitioner's Brief on appeal at 4-12). 
In response, the State argued that petitioner had 
helped draft the instruction, thus inviting the instructional 
error, and that the court should therefore decline to review 
petitioner's claim on the merits (Respondent's Brief on appeal at 
3-7, Appendix C). 
Following an expedited hearing pursuant to rule 31, 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the court of appeals affirmed 
petitioner's conviction (Order of Affirmance, March 31, 1992, 
Appendix D). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On the evening of November 29, 1989, after completing 
their work, petitioner and his stepson, David Bailey, were being 
driven home by their employer, Eddy McKelvey (Transcript of 
trial, hereinafter MT.,M at 60-62, 96-97). During the previous 
four days the three men, and another, had been working on a 
3 
drilling rig near Parachute, Colorado (T. 60-61, 97). Bailey 
testified that petitioner had been giving him a hard time while 
on the job, and petitioner acknowledged that the two had 
developed some work-related disagreements (T. 61, 163). On the 
way back to Vernal all three men drank brandy and beer, and 
Bailey and petitioner argued heatedly about Bailey's job 
performance and attitude and about money Bailey owed to 
petitioner (T. 62-63, 98-99). At one point petitioner threatened 
to "knock the shit out of [Bailey] and [his] mother [Marie, 
petitioner's wife]," if Bailey did not leave their house 
(T. 101). At some point either petitioner, or both he and 
Bailey, asked McKelvey to stop the truck so that they could fight 
it out, but McKelvey refused, whereupon the altercation subsided 
(T. 63-64, 99-102, 164, 176-79). 
Upon arriving in Vernal between 10:00 and 11:00 p.m., 
petitioner left Bailey off at their trailer, continuing on with 
McKelvey to a local bar to meet petitioner's wife (T. 64, 98, 
166, 181). Petitioner drank more at the bar and then returned to 
the trailer with Marie, with whom he was then arguing (T. 65-66, 
167, 181-82). 
Shortly after entering the trailer, petitioner and 
Bailey renewed their earlier dispute. Bailey testified that upon 
being awakened by petitioner's arguing with his mother, he 
resolved to move out of the trailer, packed some of his 
belongings and made three or four trips to his car (T. 65-66). 
After his last trip, petitioner tried to begin fighting again by 
4 
attempting to grab him while pushing Marie, who was trying to 
intercede, out of the way and that it was petitioner who threw 
the first punch (T. 66-67, 79). Bailey quickly wrestled 
petitioner to the floor, got on top of him and hit him on both 
sides of his face repeatedly, stopping when he saw blood on 
petitioner's face (T. 68). 
Marie's rendition1 of these events substantially 
corroborated Bailey's. Officers Roth and Vanderbusses both 
testified that Marie said that before the fight began petitioner 
and Bailey exchanged heated remarks about Bailey's not having to 
live there anymore and that petitioner "had it coming" (T. 107, 
122-25). 
Petitioner did not recall anyone saying anything before 
the fight began (T. 183). He claimed that Bailey set upon him at 
the instant he entered the trailer and that in the course of 
their first grappling, he did not push Marie out of the way (T. 
167, 182). 
Bailey left the trailer after having "beat the hell" 
out of petitioner, but returned about five minutes later out of 
concern for his mother's well-being (T. 69-70, 107, 123). Bailey 
claimed that as he approached the trailer he looked through the 
1
 Marie invoked the marital privilege and did not testify 
(T. 104). However, Robert Roth, Uintah County deputy sheriff and 
Robert Vanderbusses, Vernal city police officer, testified about 
what Marie had told them a short time later when they interviewed 
her in the emergency room at the Ashley Valley Medical Center in 
Vernal (T. 105-06, 116-118). Their renditions of Marie's 
testimony substantially agreed with Bailey's account (T. 107-08, 
121-25). 
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window and observed petitioner looking through all the kitchen 
cupboards and shelves and then walking to the back room, while 
overhearing petitioner yelling, "Where are my bullets?" (T. 70) 
Bailey then entered the trailer and asked his mother to leave 
with him (T. 71, 107, 123), The two were leaving the premises in 
Bailey's car when Marie remembered that she had left her purse in 
the trailer. Bailey insisted on retrieving it for her, returned 
to the trailer and opened the door (T. 72, 108, 123). 
Bailey's and petitioner's accounts at trial of the 
events that quickly followed again differed in small but 
significant ways. Bailey testified that when he opened the door 
petitioner was standing in the living room about four (4) feet 
away. Bailey did not say anything as he opened the door (T.74). 
Petitioner turned and looked at him for about two seconds, raised 
his .22 calibre pistol and, without gesture or comment, pointed 
the gun at Bailey's chest and fired (T. 73-74). Bailey then 
turned and ran for the car, and Marie took him to the hospital 
(T. 74). 
Petitioner testified that after Bailey had beaten him 
and left with Marie, he was trying to collect himself and locate 
the telephone book to call the police when "[Bailey] just jerked 
that door back like that and stepped in like this" (T. 171). He 
described Bailey as "crouched down," and then straightening up 
with arms flung wide with one foot in and one foot outside of the 
trailer door (T. 191). Within fifteen to thirty seconds 
petitioner reached for the gun, which was in the top of his 
6 
opened traveling bag (T. 170-73, 188-89, 193). Bailey 
immediately stopped moving (T. 191-92). Bailey was then about 
four feet from petitioner.2 Indicating, at trial, that he had 
twice had his neck fused and was afraid for his life, petitioner 
fired one shot towards the opening in the doorway not filled by 
Bailey's body (T. 169-72, 189-92). He claimed he only intended 
to scare Bailey, though he recognized that shooting as he did was 
dangerous and that it was likely to cause serious damage if he 
hit someone (T. 172, 192-3). 
Dr. Norman Nielson examined Bailey in the emergency 
room at the Ashley Valley Medical Center. He found that the 
bullet from petitioner's gun had entered Bailey's chest two 
inches to the left of the sternum, penetrated the left lung, 
passed within one inch of his heart and came to rest on the 
backside of the chest just underneath the skin. The bullet wound 
caused air and blood to leak into the chest cavity, resulting in 
a life threatening condition. It took two hours to stabilize 
Bailey, after which he was helicoptered to the University of Utah 
Medical Center (T. 149-50). 
Dr. Nielson also examined petitioner, following his 
arrest, and found that he had suffered extensive, though not 
2
 The estimation of distance is Bailey's (T. 73). 
Petitioner's estimation of distance was made with respect to an 
exhibit, not part of the record on appeal, and was not made 
explicit (T. 171). However, he did testify that he was within a 
foot of his traveling bag containing the gun, which lay on top of 
the breakfast bar, when Bailey opened the trailer door (T. 188-
89). A photograph of the interior of the trailer, State's 
exhibit 8, appears to support Bailey's estimate. 
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life-threatening blows to his face. He also noted that despite 
prior surgeries to fuse three of his cervical vertebrae, one of 
the discs had slipped, leaving petitioner with a potential for 
paralysis or death in the event of further slippage. A hard blow 
to the face or being tackled could cause such slippage (T. 152-
155). Petitioner claimed that he was scared all the time about 
injuring his neck, but that it had not kept him from engaging in 
heavy physical work in the five years following his injury in 
1985 (T. 169, 196). Bailey claimed that he knew petitioner had 
neck problems but did not know at the time of the incident that 
he had a neck fusion (T. 87-89). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Petitioner claims that although he failed to object to 
the trial court's reasonable doubt instruction, this Court may 
nonetheless review the matter for "plain error." Utah case law 
plainly states that where a defendant has not only failed to 
object to the instruction at trial, but also has led the trial 
court into the alleged error by actively waiving any objection, 
the appellate court will decline to review the matter. 
The reasonable doubt jury instruction did not give rise 
to reversible error under the plain error rule. The instruction 
was the substantial equivalent of that disapproved in State v. 
Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1989), and found incorrect by a 
majority in State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141 (Utah 1989), and 
therefore, obviously incorrect. However, the error in submitting 
the instruction did not give rise to reversible error because 
8 
there was no reasonable likelihood of a different result if the 
instruction had not been given. There is no doubt that 
petitioner had the requisite mens rea for manslaughter and that 
he deliberately shot the victim. Further, there is no doubt that 
a reasonable man in petitioner's position could reasonably have 
believed that it was necessary to fire the gun when the victim 




PETITIONER, WHO HELPED DRAFT THE REASONABLE 
DOUBT INSTRUCTION GIVEN BY THE TRIAL COURT, 
INVITED ERROR, AND THUS SHOULD NOT BE 
PERMITTED TO COMPLAIN OF ERROR ON APPEAL. 
On appeal petitioner effectively acknowledged that he 
had failed to raise in the trial court the claim that the 
reasonable doubt jury instruction was defective (Petitioner's 
Brief on appeal, 11 at Point IV). 
In response, the State argued that not only had 
petitioner failed to raise the jury instruction issue in the 
trial court, but he had also helped draft the instruction. Thus, 
on the authority of this Court's ruling in State v. Medina, 738 
P.2d 1021 (Utah 1987), the State argued that the court should 
decline to review petitioner's claim on the merits. 
Following an expedited hearing pursuant to rule 31, 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the court of appeals affirmed 
petitioner's conviction (Order of Affirmance, Appendix D). 
"As a general rule, a timely and specific objection 
9 
must be made in order to preserve an issue for appeal. Absent a 
timely objection, [an appellate court] will review an alleged 
error only if it is obvious and harmful, i.e., only if it 
constitutes "plain error." State v. Whittle, 780 P.2d 819, 820-
21 (Utah 1989) (citations omitted). "But if a party through 
counsel has made a conscious decision to refrain from objection 
or has led the trial court into error. Tan appellate court! will 
then decline to save that party from the error." State v. 
Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 158 (Utah 1989) (emphasis added), cert, 
denied, 110 S. Ct. 3270 (1990). 
In Medina, this Court rejected a challenge to a jury 
instruction on precisely the grounds argued by the State to the 
court of appeals in this case. In Medina, the trial court 
distributed to both counsel for the defendant and the State a 
proposed Allen instruction for their consideration before 
submitting it to the jury. In response to the court's inquiry as 
to the acceptability of the instruction the defendant's counsel 
answered, "I have no objection. I have read it." Medina, 738 
P.2d at 1022. The defendant was convicted and appealed on the 
grounds that the jury instruction impermissibly interfered with 
his right to a jury trial. Recognizing that his failure to 
object in the trial court precluded him, as a general rule, from 
assigning error on appeal under rule 19(c), Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, the defendant argued that the supreme court 
could review the matter in order to avoid "manifest injustice." 
10 
Id- at 1023.3 
In affirming the conviction this Court stated: 
It is true that in reliance on this 
provision [of rule 19(c)], we have considered 
the propriety of instructions with respect to 
which an objection has not been made below. 
However, uniformly these have been situations 
where counsel for the party complaining on 
appeal merely remained silent. The instant 
case presents a very different situation. 
Here, defense counsel did not remain silent; 
rather, she actively represented to the court 
that she had read the instruction and had no 
objection. Apparently, Medina's counsel 
considered the issue and consciously decided 
that it was in Medina's interest to have the 
instruction given. Although in retrospect 
this decision may appear to have been ill-
advised, the fact remains that counsel 
consciously chose not to assert any objection 
that might have been raised and affirmatively 
led the trial court to believe that there was 
nothing wrong with the instruction. Under 
such circumstances, we decline to review the 
instruction under the manifest error 
exception to Rule 19(cl. 
Ibid, (emphasis added)/ 
3
 Rule 19, Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure, provides in 
pertinent part: 
(c) No party may assign as error any portion 
of the charge or omission therefrom unless he 
objects thereto before the jury is 
instructed, stating distinctly the matter to 
which he objects and the ground of his 
objection. Notwithstanding a party's failure 
to object, error may be assigned to 
instructions in order to avoid a manifest 
injustice. 
4
 Subsequent to its ruling in Medina, this Court held "that 
in most circumstances the term 'manifest injustice [as it appears 
in rule 19(c)]' is synonymous with the 'plain error' standard 
expressly provided in Utah Rule of Evidence 103(d) and elaborated 
upon in fState v. Eldredoe, 773 P.2d 29 (Utah 1989), cert. 
11 
In this case petitioner has never candidly acknowledged 
that, instead of merely failing to object to the trial court's 
proposed reasonable doubt instruction, he actively collaborated 
in writing them, evidenced by the following colloquy 
instructions: 
The Court: Then we have proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt. It's a two-paragraph one. 
It's the one that goes, "It's not one that is 
nearly [sic] fanciful or imaginary." It's 
the more expanded one that we have used. 
Mr. Souvall [Petitioner's Counsel]: This is 
the one that I objected to on the Ellifritz 
trial because it has the word "substantial" 
in it. A reasonable doubt is one that is 
real and substantial. I think substantial is 
way too strong of a word to describe a 
reasonable doubt. 
The Court: I don't. The more I have thought 
about it the more I think that is probably 
the best description we can give them. But I 
understand your concern. What do you suggest 
as an alternative? 
Mr. Souvall: Delete the sentence. Just, 
["I]t is a doubt based upon reason and one 
which reasonable men and women would have 
upon a consideration of the evidence.["] 
Just delete that before the semicolon. 
The Court: You would have to say, ["A] 
doubt, reasonable doubt, and is a doubt based 
upon . . .," 
Mr. Souvall: Yes. 
Mr. Williams [State Prosecutor]: I will not 
go over the ["]substantial,["] but I think I 
would still want the ["]real["] language, 
["A] reasonable doubt is one which is real 
and is based upon reason.["] 
denied, 493 U.S. 814]." State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 121-22 
(Utah 1989). Thus, petitioner's claim of plain error is properly 
addressed under the manifest injustice standard of rule 19(c). 
12 
The Court: ["]Reasonable doubt is one which 
is real and is based upon . . . [.H] Okay, 
Harry? 
Mr. Souvall: That's fine. I won't object to 
that. 
The Court: ["] A reasonable doubt is one 
which is real and based upon reason and one 
which is --[•"] 
Mr* Souvall: What instruction number was 
that? 
The Court: 5. 
(Transcript of Trial at 199-200) (emphasis added). 
The colloquy makes clear that petitioner's 
participation in preparing the instruction evidenced a conscious 
effort to design an instruction that would not improperly expand 
the degree of doubt allowable for a conviction. Also, a brief 
examination of jury instruction 5/ in conjunction with the above 
colloquy, reveals that the trial court fully accommodated 
petitioner's counsel's request over its own considerations about 
the best instruction to give to the jury (Jury Instruction #5, R. 
81, attached herein at Appendix E). 
Considering a similar, deliberate failure to object in 
the trial court, this Court in Bullock stated: 
'[T]he plain error . . . test . . . 
ultimately permit[s] the appellate court to 
balance the need for procedural regularity 
with the demands of fairness.'. • . 
If the decision was conscious and did not 
amount to ineffective assistance of counsel, 
this Court should refuse to consider the 
merits of the trial court's ruling. Indeed, 
the failure to object in such instances 
should be treated as a conscious waiver and 
13 
should preclude further consideration of the 
issue. 
Bullock, 791 P.2d at 158-59 (footnote omitted). In explaining 
the relationship between the plain error and invited error, the 
Court said: 
The plain error rule exists to permit 
review of trial court rulings as way of 
protecting a defendant from the harm that can 
be caused from less-than-perfect counsel. 
But the purpose of that rule is in no way 
implicated if defense counsel consciously 
elects to permit evidence to be admitted as 
part of a defense strategy rather than 
through inadvertence or neglect. 
Ibid, (emphasis added).5 
In State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, (Utah 1987), a death 
penalty case, this Court found no prejudice resulting from 
alleged prosecutorial misconduct because it found the defendant 
invited the improper remarks. Commenting on the impropriety of 
invited error, this Court stated: 
A defendant should not be permitted to 
initiate an argument before a jury and make 
use of it, then wait until after the 
prosecutor has responded to it and complain 
5
 In both Bullock and Medina, the defendants also claimed on 
appeal that each of their trial counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance in failing to object with respect to the alleged 
substantive errors, i.e., inadmissible expert testimony and the 
improper Allen charge, respectively. In this case no claim of 
ineffective assistance had been made. However, even if an 
ineffective assistance claim were made, it would have no impact 
on the result, since, as argued below, there would have been no 
reasonable likelihood of a different. See State v. Templin, 805 
P.2d 182, 186-87 (noting that the second element of a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel is the showing that apart from 
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 697, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2069 (1984), reh'g denied, 467 
U.S. 1267, 104 S. Ct. 3562 (1984). 
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it was improper on appeal. Otherwise, the 
possibility of invited error will become the 
general rule. 
Id. at 561. See also State v. Thompson. 110 Utah 113, 130-31, 
170 P.2d 153, 161-62 (1946) (refusing to reverse where elements 
instructions requested by defendant were comparable to similarly 
erroneous instructions given by trial court); State v. Gleason. 
17 Utah 2d 150, 151, 405 P.2d 793, 794-95 (1965) (finding 
"eleventh hour" request for additional jury instructions "should 
be canvassed in an atmosphere of invited error" because 
procedurally unjustified where there was ample opportunity to 
avoid the dilemma); State v. Perdue. 813 P.2d 1201, 1203-06 (Utah 
App. 1991) (refusing to consider an allegedly deficient 
reasonable doubt jury instruction, submitted by the defendant, 
and opining "where invited error butts up against manifest 
injustice, the invited error rule prevails"). 
There was no further discussion by petitioner in the 
trial court concerning the sufficiency of the trial court's 
reasonable doubt instruction. Petitioner positively acceded to 
the reasonable doubt instruction proposed by the trial court, 
which was amended at his request to reflect a more favorable 
reasonable doubt standard. Thus, as in Medina, this Court should 
decline to review a claim that an instruction was erroneously 
given, when the error, if any, has been invited. 
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POINT II 
IT WAS NOT PLAIN ERROR TO SUBMIT THE 
REQUESTED REASONABLE DOUBT JURY INSTRUCTION 
BECAUSE IT HAS NEVER BEEN FOUND REVERSIBLE, 
AND PETITIONER, IN ANY EVENT, WAS NOT 
PREJUDICED UNDER THE FACTS OF THE CASE. 
Petitioner claimed on appeal that the reasonable doubt 
instruction he requested below was improper under State v. 
Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1989) (Stewart, J., dissenting); 
State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141 (Utah 1989); State v. Pedersen, 
802 P.2d 1328 (Utah App. 1990), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 
1991); and Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. , 111 S. Ct. 328 
(1990).6 While this Court's opinions in Ireland and Johnson 
clearly offer support for defendant's argument, they just as 
clearly do not offer support for his contentions under the plain 
error doctrine. 
"The burden of showing error is on the party who seeks 
6
 The State does not deny that a reasonable doubt 
instruction must adequately convey the State's burden of proof. 
The issue here concerns the adequacy of language employed to 
achieve that purpose. Thus, the Supreme Court's holding in Cage 
is not apposite to this case since the challenged language there 
was entirely different than that which appears in the challenged 
instruction in this case. 
Petitioner's reliance on Pedersen as a basis for the 
retroactive application of appropriate reasonable doubt standards 
is also misplaced. In Pedersen, the court upheld a reasonable 
doubt instruction that had been purged of the language found 
objectionable in Ireland (see Pedersen, 802 P.2d at 1331-32). 
The instruction ruled on by the court of appeals, therefore, was 
neither that which this Court had before it in Ireland, nor that 
which the trial court submitted in this case. Thus, Pedersen 
cannot stand as clear authority in support of the claim that an 
instruction containing the language found objectionable in 
Ireland gives rise to reversible error, and, therefore, Pedersen 
is not relevant authority to be applied retroactively. 
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to upset the judgment." State v. Noren, 704 P.2d 568, 571 (Utah 
1985) (quoting State v. Jones, 657 P.2d 1263, 1267 (Utah 1982)). 
A. This Court Should Decline to Review 
Petitioner's Plain Error Claim for Failure to 
Support Argument with Either Citation to the 
Record or Legal Authority. 
"A separate and independent basis for the affirmance of 
the trial court is that the defendant failed to refer to any 
portion of the record that factually supports his contentions on 
appeal." State v. Tucker, 657 P.2d 755, 757 (Utah 1982). 
Additionally, an appellate court will decline to rule on argument 
unsupported by any legal analysis or authority. State v. 
Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984). 
Recognizing his failure to timely object to the 
instruction in the trial court, petitioner argued to the court of 
appeals (and to this Court on writ of certiorari) that it should 
consider his claim under the plain error rule (Petitioner's Brief 
on appeal at 2-4). However, petitioner's argument below has been 
entirely devoted to showing that the challenged instruction was 
improper. Petitioner has cited authority for the purpose behind 
the plain error, but has entirely failed to (1) identify the 
requirements of the plain error rule, i.e., obviousness and 
harmfulness, (2) support any argument with respect to the 
requirements with facts from the record or (3) support his 
argument with any legal analysis or citation to authority. On 
such facts this Court should decline to consider petitioner's 
plain error claim. In any event, petitioner's claim is 
insufficient under the plain error rule. 
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B* Submitting the Instruction was not Plain 
Error, 
,f[T]he plain error rule's purpose is to permit [the 
appellate court] to avoid injustice." State v. Eldredae, 773 
P,2d 29, 35 n.8 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 814. "The 
first requirement for a finding of plain error is that the error 
by 'plain,' i.e., from [the appellate court's] examination of the 
record, [the appellate court] must be able to say that it should 
have been obvious to a trial court that it was committing error. 
The second and somewhat interrelated requirement for a finding of 
plain error is that the error affect the substantial rights of 
the accused, i.e., that the error be harmful." Ld. at 35 
(citations and footnote omitted). In showing the instructional 
error harmful, "the appellant must show a reasonable likelihood 
that absent the error, the outcome below would have been more 
favorable." State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 122 (Utah 1989). See 
also rule 30, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure ("Any error, 
defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the 
substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded.") 
1. The Trial Court Submitted an 
Obviously Incorrect Instruction. 
In State v. Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1989), the 
defendant challenged a reasonable doubt instruction given by the 
trial court. Justice Stewart, dissenting, identified three 
distinct problems in that instruction. First, the instruction 
effectively and erroneously equated an "abiding conviction of the 
truth of the charge" with a lack of reasonable doubt, and thereby 
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failed to obviate all reasonable doubt. Id. 773 P.2d at 1381. 
Second, it improperly permitted the type of decision-making 
process which governs one in "the more weighty affairs of life" 
to be applied to the determination of guilt in a criminal 
proceeding. Jld. at 1381-82. Third, it inappropriately 
instructed that a reasonable doubt might "not merely be a 
possibility." JCd. at 1382. Notwithstanding Justice Stewart's 
criticisms, this Court upheld the instruction, noting that burden 
of proof requirements were supplemented by two other 
instructions, which (1) required the prosecution to establish 
every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt and (2) 
identified the presumption of innocence and entitled the 
defendant to an acquittal if there remained a reasonable doubt. 
Id. at 1380. However, the majority accorded those criticisms 
respect and directed trial courts to discontinue the use of the 
"more weighty affairs of life language," and "possible or 
imaginary" language which might be understood to diminish the 
prosecution's standard of proof. Ibid. 
In State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141 (Utah 1989), this 
Court upheld a conviction wherein reasonable doubt instructions, 
also supported by other instructions which identified the 
presumption of innocence and proof of the elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, again contained the "more weighty affairs of 
life" language. JCd. 774 P.2d at 1146. Justice Stewart concurred 
in the result, opining that while the instruction was not 
correct, it "[did] not rise to the level of reversible error." 
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Id. at 1147-48. Justice Stewart's concurrence would appear to be 
based on the challenged instruction's omission of the "possible 
or imaginary" language, found disfavored in Ireland. Justice 
Zimmerman, with Justice Durham concurring, agreed with Justice 
Stewart that the instruction was not correct, but concurred in 
the result because, in light of the evidence, the error was 
harmless. .Id. at 1149. Thus, following Johnson, a majority of 
this Court considered the Ireland-type instruction incorrect. 
The State recognizes that the instruction given in this 
case is very similar to that submitted in Johnson. It contains 
the phrase, "more weighty and important matters relating to your 
affairs," making it the substantial equivalent of the "more 
weighty affairs of life" language disapproved of in Ireland and 
by three justices in Johnson, 774 P.2d at 1147-48 (see Jury 
Instruction 5, R. 81, Appendix A). The instruction also stated: 
"A reasonable doubt is not one that is merely possible, fanciful, 
or imaginary, because almost everything related to human affairs 
is open to some possible doubt." Therefore, for the purposes of 
plain error analysis, the State concedes that any court cognizant 
of this Court's supervisory directive in Ireland, and the 
concurrence of three justices in Johnson, would have been on 
clear notice that the instruction given in this case was 
disfavored.7 
7
 By the same reasoning, the instruction is also no more 
deficient than those given in either Ireland or Johnson. As in 
Ireland and Johnson, the trial court submitted other instructions 
which (1) placed on the State the burden of proving of proving 
every element of the crime of which petitioner was convicted 
20 
Having conceded the obviousness of the error, as a 
matter of law, the State would, however, contend that the error 
was not blatantly obvious. Only by having recognized that the 
concurrence of Justice Zimmerman and Justice Durham in Justice 
Stewart's concurring opinion in Johnson, a conviction otherwise 
affirmed, would the trial court have understood that the 
reasonable doubt instruction was no longer approved by a majority 
of this Court. In contrast is the type of notice conveyed in 
this Court's opinion in State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986). 
There this Court specifically directed trial courts to give a 
cautionary instruction where eyewitness identification was a 
central issue in the case and such was requested by the defense, 
while expressly noting that the Court was in the course of 
abandoning the discretionary approach to such instructions and 
reversing previously controlling authority. .Id. at 492 
(reversing State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56 (Utah 1982)). In fact, 
no Utah conviction has ever been reversed on the ground that 
instructions comparable to those in Ireland and Johnson were 
given to the jury. 
beyond a reasonable doubt and (2) identified the presumption of 
innocence (Jury Instruction Nos. 2 and 10, at R. 79 and 88, 
respectively). 
Also, the statement, by its construction, puts "merely 
possible" doubt in the category of "imaginary" and "fanciful" 
speculation, expressly recognized by Justice Stewart as properly 
distinguished from reasonable doubt, see Ireland, 773 P.2d at 
1382 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Interpreting the sentence in 
this manner also renders it the functional equivalent of that 
quoted above from Johnson, wherein proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt does not require the "excluding of all possibility of 
error" to an absolute certainty. .Id. at 1148. 
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2. There was No Reasonable Likelihood 
of a Different Outcome on the Facts. 
M[J]ury instructions are to be considered as a whole. 
When taken as a whole if they fairly tender the case to the jury, 
the fact that one or more of the instructions, standing alone, 
are not as full or accurate as they might have been is not 
reversible error." State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537, 542 (Utah 
1981); accord Holland v. United States, 75 S. Ct. 127, 137-38 
(1954) (reasonable doubt instruction may be misleading alone, but 
acceptable when read in combination with other jury 
instructions). A conviction will be overturned only if a 
defendant can show that but for the erroneous instruction there 
was "a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result." 
Johnson, 774 P.2d at 1146 n.16 (citing Tillman 750 P.2d at 561), 
1149 (Zimmerman, J., concurring); Verde, 770 P.2d at 122 
(applying the Johnson harmless error standard to plain error 
analysis). 
Petitioner was convicted of attempted manslaughter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. SS 76-4-101 and 76-5-205(1)(b) and (c) 
(1990) (see /Jury Instruction #11, R. 88). Section 76-5-205(1)(c) 
provides: 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes 
manslaughter if the actor: 
• • • • 
(c) causes the death of another under 
circumstances where the actor reasonably 
believes the circumstances provide legal 
justification or excuse for his conduct 
although the conduct is not legally 
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justifiable or excusable under the existing 
circumstances. 
Pursuant to section 76-4-101, the jury was instructed 
that the elements of "attempt" are (1) "the same mental state of 
mind required for the commission of the offense" and (2) "conduct 
constituting a substantial step towards the commission of the 
offense" (Jury Instruction #14, R. 93). 
The mental state required to prove attempted 
manslaughter under section 76-5-205(1)(c) is intent to cause 
death or serious bodily injury. See State v. Howell. 649 P.2d 
91, 94 (Utah 1982) (holding that the mens rea for attempted 
manslaughter under section 76-5-205(1)(c) is intentional 
conduct); State v. Norman. 580 P.2d 237, 240 (Utah 1978) (finding 
the requisite mental element to support a conviction of attempted 
manslaughter is the intent to kill or cause serious bodily 
injury). See also 2 Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., 
Substantive Criminal Law §7.10 (1986) (noting that most killings 
which constitute voluntary manslaughter are of the intent-to-kill 
sort, but that theoretically they might also be of the intent-to-
do-serious-bodily-injury type). 
The undisputed facts are that petitioner fired a gun at 
the victim, the bullet passing within two inches of the victim's 
heart (T. 149-50). Petitioner claims that he only fired in 
Bailey's direction, intending to scare him (T. 192), but the jury 
evidently did not believe him, and the facts do not at all 
support petitioner's explanation. Petitioner was only about four 
feet from Bailey when he shot him, a fact corroborated by the 
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photograph and petitioner's admission of his position in the 
trailer (T. 188-89; State's Ex. 8). Bailey testified that 
petitioner deliberately took aim at his chest and fired (T. 73-
74). 
Petitioner's denial is unbelievable on those facts and 
on his patent lack of credibility generally. He refused to 
acknowledge that he encouraged or baited Bailey into an argument, 
denying not only Bailey's testimony, but also that of McKelvey, 
an uninterested witness whose overall testimony clearly indicated 
that he intended petitioner no harm (T. 175-78). Nonetheless, 
petitioner claimed that McKelvey made up his testimony (T. 178-
9). He claimed that upon his entering the trailer, Bailey 
immediately attacked him without provocation, an allegation 
denied not only by Bailey, but by his wife Marie, whose even-
handedness was shown by her refusal to testify against her 
husband directly (T. 65-66, 107, 122, 167, 182-83). He clearly 
suggested that he was unable to use the phone book to call the 
police because he was still trying to collect himself after being 
severely beaten (T. 193-94). However, petitioner would still 
have had the jury believe that in that groggy state, in a matter 
of seconds, he had the presence of mind to grab a gun, about 
which he had not been thinking and which just happened to be 
within arm's reach, and fire at a target just four feet away 
which he intended to miss (T. 171-73, 189, 192) Most remarkably, 
petitioner testified that in the past he had fired the .22 
caliber pistol before without having first to cock it (T. 190). 
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The testimony was an obvious effort to support his story that he 
instantaneously reached for the gun when Bailey appeared and to 
refute the inference that he had already located and loaded the 
pistol before Bailey opened the trailer door. However, Bailey 
testified that minutes before he had witnessed petitioner 
searching for the bullets to his gun (T. 70). More tellingly, 
deputy Roth testified that the gun was a single action revolver 
which required the hammer be physically pulled back before it 
could be fired (T. 115). In light of these remarkable denials it 
cannot be doubted that petitioner was lying about his intent to 
merely scare Bailey. 
Petitioner's defense was justification. The jury was 
instructed, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402 (1990), that 
a person is justified in using force against 
another person when he reasonably believes 
the force is necessary to defend himself 
against the other person's imminent use of 
unlawful force: however, a person is 
justified in using force which is intended or 
likely to cause death or serious bodily 
injury only if he reasonably believes that 
the force is necessary to prevent death or 
serious bodily injury to himself. 
A person is not justified in using force 
if he: 
(a) initially provokes the use of force 
against himself with the intent to use force 
to inflict bodily harm, or 
(b) if he was the aggressor or was 
involved in a combat by agreement unless he 
totally withdrew from the encounter and 
effectively communicated to the other person 
his intent to withdraw from the fight. 
(Jury Instruction #16, R. 95) (emphasis added). The jury was 
further instructed that the "reasonableness" of petitioner's 
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belief was to be determined by an objective standard, though 
petitioner's actual beliefs could be a part of that determination 
(Jury Instruction #17A, R. 97). 
In State v. Clayton, 658 P.2d 624 (Utah 1983), this 
Court found the defendant, convicted of attempted murder, had no 
rational basis for self-defense where, immediately prior to his 
being shot, the victim had nothing in his hand, made no sudden 
moves toward the defendant and did not reach for anything in his 
pocket. See also In re Gonzales, 545 P.2d 187 (Utah 1975) 
(finding no basis for self-defense where the defendant simply 
shot his assailant immediately after being punched by him); State 
v. Brown. 607 P.2d 261 (Utah 1980) (finding no credible evidence 
of self-defense where the defendant could simply have closed the 
door when he saw from inside the trailer his alleged assailant 
pick up a club). 
The State does not deny that a reasonable man with 
petitioner's physical infirmities, beaten as petitioner had been, 
could reasonably believe that deadly force was necessary to repel 
a similar, imminent onslaught. However, the facts provide no 
reasonable support for such a defense in this case. 
Bailey testified only that he opened the door and 
petitioner almost immediately fired the gun directly at him (T. 
73-74). Petitioner claimed that Bailey jerked open the door, 
that Bailey jumped in the door, possibly with his "arms out, 
perhaps in a wrestling type of stance," with one foot inside and 
one foot outside the trailer (T. 190-91). The cross-examination 
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then continues: 
MR. WILLIAMS [Prosecutor]: Is that a fair 
description, Mr. Montgomery? 
PETITIONER: Yes sir, sure is. 
MR. WILLIAMS: Okay. Was he moving towards 
vou? 
PETITIONER: Best I recall, he stopped. 
MR. WILLIAMS: Okay. What did you think when 
he stopped? 
PETITIONER: I didn't know. 
(T. 191-92) (emphasis added). 
Petitioner admitted that between fifteen and thirty 
seconds passed before he drew the gun and fired at Bailey (T. 
193). Thus, under the most favorable interpretation of the facts 
for petitioner, Bailey made no immediate advance upon him after 
he opened the door and that he hesitated to enter the trailer. 
The only reasonable inference is that Bailey stopped moving when 
he perceived a gun being pointed directly at him, whether it was 
grabbed hastily or deliberately. However, under any 
interpretation, Bailey had not actually entered the trailer and 
was not advancing on petitioner when petitioner shot him. Under 
these facts, a reasonable man could only have believed that an 
attack was no longer imminent, that he had exercised sufficient 
force by merely pointing the gun at his alleged assailant to 
repel an attack and that there was no longer a rational necessity 
to fire the gun. 
Additionally, there is no doubt that had the jury 
considered petitioner's quarrels with Bailey earlier in the 
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evening as evidence of petitioner's provoking the use of force 
against himself, it would have been compelled to deny petitioner 
his claim of self-defense. On the testimony of Bailey, McKelvey 
and Marie, there is no question that petitioner played an active 
role in provoking Bailey's violently beating him. Furthermore 
Bailey testified that petitioner threw the first punch, and 
although both he and petitioner denied that petitioner had hit 
him in the trailer, deputy Hollebeke testified that Bailey had 
some light contusions on the right side of his face (T. 139). 
In sum, there is no reasonable likelihood, given the 
facts of the case, that the outcome would have been different 
even if a proper reasonable doubt instruction had been submitted 
to the jury. Because petitioner has failed to show that the 
submission of the instruction was prejudicial error, this Court 
should reject his claim of plain error and affirm his conviction. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully 
requests this Court to affirm petitioner's conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this W day of September, 1992. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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76*2-402. Force in defense of person — Forcible felony de-
fined. 
(1) A person is justified in threatening or using force against another when 
and to the extent that he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to 
defend himself or a third person against such other's imminent use of unlaw-
ful force; however, a person is justified in using force which is intended or 
likely to cause death or serious bodily iqjury only if he reasonably believes 
that the force is necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury to himself 
or a third person, or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony. 
(2) A person is not justified in using force under the circumstances specified 
in Subsection (1) if he: 
(a) initially provokes the use of force against himself with the intent to 
use force as an excuse to inflict bodily harm upon the assailant; or 
(b) is attempting to commit, committing, or fleeing after the commis-
sion or attempted commission of a felony; or 
(c) was the aggressor or was engaged in a combat by agreement, unless 
he withdraws from the encounter and effectively communicates to such 
other person his intent to do so and the other notwithstanding continues 
or threatens to continue the use of unlawful force. 
(3) For purposes of this section, a forcible felony includes aggravated as-
sault, mayhem, aggravated murder, murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, and 
aggravated kidnapping, rape, forcible sodomy, and aggravated sexual assault, 
as they are defined in Title 76, Chapter 5, and also includes arson, robbery, 
and burglary, as defined in Title 76, Chapter 6. Any other felony offense 
which involves the use of force or violence against a person so as to create a 
substantial danger of death or serious bodily injury also constitutes a forcible 
felony. Burglary of a vehicle, as defined in Section 76-6-204, does not consti-
tute a forcible felony except when the vehicle is occupied at the time unlawful 
entry is made or attempted. 
Utah Code Ann. (1990) 
76-4-101. Attempt — Elements of offense. 
(1) For purposes of this part a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a 
crime if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the com-
mission of the offense, he engages in conduct constituting a substantial step 
toward commission of the offense. 
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct does not constitute a substantial step 
unless it is strongly corroborative of the actor's intent to commit the offense. 
(3) No defense to the offense of attempt shall arise: 
(a) Because the offense attempted was actually committed; or 
(b) Due to factual or legal impossibility if the offense could have been 
committed had the attendant circumstances been as the actor believed 
them to be. 
76-5-205. Manslaughter. 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter if the actor: 
(a) recklessly causes the death of another; or 
(b) causes the death of another under the influence of extreme emo-
tional disturbance for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse; 
or 
(c) causes the death of another under circumstances where the actor 
reasonably believes the circumstances provide a legal justification or ex-
cuse for his conduct although the conduct is not legally justifiable or 
excusable under the existing circumstances. 
(2) Under Subsection (l)(b), emotional disturbance does not include a condi-
tion resulting from mental illness as defined in Section 76-2-305. 
(3) The reasonableness of an explanation or excuse under Subsection (1Kb), 
or the reasonable belief of the actor under Subsection (l)(c), shall be deter-
mined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person under the then existing 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, I 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 910284-CA 
v. s 
CHARLES MONTGOMERY, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for attempted 
manslaughter, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-205 and § 76-4-101 (1990), in the Eighth Judicial 
District Court in and for Uintah County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Dennis L. Draney, presiding. This Court has 
jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
S 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1991). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The sole issue presented in this case is: 
1. Should this Court review the merits of defendant's 
claim on appeal, that the trial court submitted to the jury an 
inadequate instruction on reasonable doubt, an instruction to 
which defendant positively acceded at trial? An issue not raised 
in the trial court is not properly preserved for review, state 
v. Pascual, 804 P.2d 553, 554 n.l (Utah App. 1991). However, the 
appellate court may review an issue improperly preserved for 
appeal if the trial court has committed "plain error." Ibid. 
"But if a party through counsel has made a conscious decision to 
refrain from objecting or has led the trial court into error, [an 
appellate court] will then decline to save that party from the 
error." State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 158 (Utah 1989). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Determinative constitutional provisions, statutes and 
rules are compiled in an Appendix where not set forth in the body 
of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Charles Montgomery, was charged by 
information with attempted murder, a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 and S 76-4-101 (1990) 
(R. 1). Following a jury trial, he was convicted of attempted 
manslaughter, a third degree felony, under Utah Code Ann. 
SS 76-5-205 and 76-4-101 (1990), and was sentenced to a term of 
not more than five (5) years in the Utah State Prison (R. 173-
74). Defendant filed motions for a new trial and arrest of 
judgment, which were denied (R. 166-69, 182-83). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
A recitation of the facts here involved is not 
necessary to a resolution of the issues raised on appeal. 
Rather, critical facts will be discussed in the body of this 
brief as they become relevant to specific issues. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant claims that although he failed to object to 
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the trial court's reasonable doubt instruction, this Court may 
nonetheless review the matter for "plain error." Utah case law 
plainly states that where a defendant has not only failed to 
object to the instruction at trial, but also has led the trial 
court into the alleged error by actively waiving any objection, 
the appellate court will decline to review the matter. 
ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT ACCEDED TO THE REASONABLE DOUBT 
INSTRUCTION GIVEN BY THE TRIAL COURT, AND 
THUS CANNOT COMPLAIN ON APPEAL. 
Defendant acknowledges through his rendition of the 
record and citation to authority that he failed to object to the 
reasonable doubt instruction given to the jury and thereby failed 
to preserve his claim of error on appeal (Appellant's Brief at 4-
6). An issue not raised in the trial court is not properly 
preserved for review. State v. Pascual, 804 P.2d 553, 554 n.l 
(Utah App. 1991). Nonetheless, he argues that this Court should 
consider the merits of his claim and find that the trial court 
committed plain error in giving an instruction that allegedly 
misstates the reasonable doubt standard. The argument is utterly 
without merit. 
State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021 (Utah 1987), presents a 
factual scenario almost identical to this case and is fully 
dispositive of the issue defendant raises on appeal. In Medina 
the trial court distributed to both counsel for the defendant and 
the State a proposed instruction for their consideration before 
submitting it to the jury. In response to the court's inquiry as 
3 
to the acceptability of the instructionf the defendant's counsel 
answered, "I have no objection. I have read it." Id. at 1022. 
The defendant was convicted and appealed on the ground that the 
jury instruction impermissibly interfered with his right to a 
jury trial. Recognizing that his failure to object in the trial 
court precluded him, as a general rule, from assigning error on 
appeal under rule 19(c), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the 
defendant argued that the supreme court could review the matter 
in order to avoid "manifest injustice." Id., at 1023.* 
In affirming the conviction the Utah Supreme Court 
stated: 
It is true that in reliance on this 
provision [of rule 19(c)], we have considered 
the propriety of instructions with respect to 
which an objection has not been made below. 
However, uniformly these have been situations 
where counsel for the party complaining on 
appeal merely remained silent. The instant 
case presents a very different situation. 
Here, defense counsel did not remain silent: 
rather, she actively represented to the court 
that she had read the instruction and had no 
objection. Apparently, Medina's counsel 
considered the issue and consciously decided 
that it was in Medina's interest to have the 
1
 Rule 19, Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure, provides in 
pertinent part: 
(c) No party may assign as error any portion 
of the charge or omission therefrom unless he 
objects thereto before the jury is 
instructed, stating distinctly the matter to 
which he objects and the ground of his 
objection. Notwithstanding a party's failure 
to object, error may be assigned to 
instructions in order to avoid a manifest 
injustice. 
4 
instruction given. Although in retrospect 
this decision may appear to have been ill-
advised, the fact remains that counsel 
consciously chose not to assert any objection 
that might have been raised and affirmatively 
led the trial court to believe that there was 
nothing wrong with the instruction. Under 
such circumstances, we decline to review the 
instruction under the manifest error 
exception to Rule 19fcK 
Ibid, (emphasis added),2 See also State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 
155, 158 (Utah 1989) ("[I]£ a party through counsel has made a 
conscious decision to refrain from objecting or has led the trial 
court into error, we will then decline to save that party from 
the error."); State v. Morgan. 813 P.2d 1207, 1211 (Utah App. 
1991) (Court declines to address the merits of the claim because 
counsel's failure to object to certain testimony was reasonable 
and presumably intended in light of his trial strategy). 
In this case defendant neglects to present this Court 
with the following colloquy amongst counsel for both sides and 
the trial court in the preparation of jury instructions: 
The Court: Then we have proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt. It's a two-paragraph one. 
It's the one that goes, "It's not one that is 
nearly [sic] fanciful or imaginary." It's 
the more expanded one that we have used. 
Mr. Souvall [Defense Counsel]: This is the 
one that I objected to on the Ellifritz trial 
because it has the word "substantial" in it. 
2
 Subsequent to its ruling in Medina, the Utah Supreme Court 
held "that in most circumstances the term 'manifest injustice [as 
it appears in rule 19(c)]' is synonymous with the 'plain error' 
standard expressly provided in Utah Rule of Evidence 103(d) and 
elaborated upon in fState v. Eldredae. 773 P.2d 29 (Utah 1989)1." 
State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 121-22 (Utah 1989). Thus, 
defendant's claim of plain error is properly addressed under the 
manifest injustice standard of rule 19(c). 
5 
A reasonable doubt is cne that is real and 
substantial. I think substantial is way too 
strong of a word to describe a reasonable 
doubt. 
The Court: I don't. The more I have thought 
about it the more I think that is probably 
the best description we can give them. But I 
understand your concern. What do you suggest 
as an alternative? 
Mr. Souvall: Delete the sentence. Just, 
[HIJt is a doubt based upon reason and one 
which reasonable men and women would have 
upon a consideration of the evidence.["] 
Just delete that before the semicolon. 
The Court: You would have to say, ["A] 
doubt, reasonable doubt, and is a doubt based 
upon . . .," 
Mr. Souvall: Yes. 
Mr. Williams [State Prosecutor]: I will not 
go over the ["]substantial,[-] but I think I 
would still want the ["]real[M] language, 
["A] reasonable doubt is one which is real 
and is based upon reason.["] 
The Court: ["]Reasonable doubt is one which 
is real and is based upon . . . [."] Okav, 
Harrv? 
Mr. Souvall: That's fine. I won't object to 
that. 
The Court: [w] A reasonable doubt is one 
which is real and based upon reason and one 
which is — [."] 
Mr. Souvall: What instruction number was 
that? 
The Court: 5.3 
3
 A brief examination of jury instruction 5, in conjunction 
with the above colloquy, reveals that the trial court fully 
accommodated defense counsel's request over its own considerations 
about the best instruction to give to the jury (Jury Instruction 
#5, R. 81, attached herein at Appendix A). 
6 
(Transcript of Trial at 199-200) (emphasis added). There was no 
further discussion concerning the sufficiency of the trial 
court's reasonable doubt instruction. Because defendant 
positively acceded to the reasonable doubt instruction, which was 
amended at his request, he, as the defendant in Medina. is in no 
position to claim on appeal that the instruction was erroneously 
given. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully 
requests this Court to affirm defendant's.conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7^ day of November, 1991. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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APPENDIX E 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that degree of proof 
that satisfies the mind and convinces the understanding of 
those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it. A 
reasonable doubt is not one that is merely possible, fanciful, 
or imaginary, because almost everything related to human 
affairs is open to some possible doubt. A reasonable doubt 
is one which is real and is based upon reason and one which 
reasonable men and women would have upon a consideration of 
all the evidence. It must arise from the evidence or lack of 
evidence in the case. 
If, after an impartial consideration and comparison of 
the evidence, you can honestly say that you are not satisfied 
of the Defendant's guilt, you have a reasonable doubt; but if 
after such impartial consideration and comparison of all the 
evidence you can truthfully say that you have an abiding 
conviction of Defendant's guilt such as you would be willing 
to act upon in the more weighty and important matters relating 
to your affairs, you have no reasonable doubt. 
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